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Abstract: This paper models how migration both influences and responds to
differences in disease prevalence between cities and shows how the possibility of
migration away from high-prevalence areas affects long-run steady state disease
prevalence. We develop a dynamic framework where migration responds to the
prevalence of disease, to the costs of migration and to the costs of living. The
model explores how pressure for migration in response to differing equilibrium
levels of disease prevalence generates differences in city characteristics such
as land rents. Competition for scarce housing in low-prevalence areas can cre-
ate segregation, with disease concentrated in high-prevalence “sinks”. We show
that policies affecting migration costs affect the steady-state disease prevalences
across cities. In particular, migration can reduce steady-state disease incidence in
low-prevalence areas while having no impact on prevalence in high-prevalence
areas. This suggests that, in some circumstances, public health measures may
need to avoid discouraging migration away from high-disease areas.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper studies the reciprocal causality between migration and the incidence of
disease. While it is well known that migration can contribute to spreading diseases
through the effect of crowding, we study its consequences for the composition of
populations, which, in turn, affects the evolution of disease. If migration responds
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to disease incidence as well as influences it, feedback effects may either dampen
or magnify initial differences in disease prevalence between locations. We show
in particular how, for a large class of infectious endemic diseases, migration can
magnify initial differences, since the healthy have a stronger incentive than the
sick to flee unhealthy neighborhoods. This can turn some localities into “sinks”
whose initial high disease prevalence attracts further sick individuals because they
cannot compete with healthy individuals for scarce space in healthier localities. We
show that several steady states can exist with different degrees of segregation of
sick and healthy individuals. In fact, higher segregation is beneficial in the model,
since it unambiguously reduces prevalence in low-prevalence locations and does
not necessarily increase it in high-prevalence locations. This has implications for
public policy towards migration and may provide a case for encouraging or even
subsidising migration that has such results.
Epidemiologists have already addressed how individual migration may con-
tribute, among other factors, to the spread of disease1 and a few studies have
assessed its relative importance in malaria’s eradication in the Early twentieth
Century United States (Barreca et al., 2011) or the contribution of forced migration
to the incidence of malaria in refugee-receiving countries (Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol, 2007). But much less is known about how migration in turn responds to
infectious diseases, although numerous historical instances have been recorded
of people fleeing plague or other epidemics by migrating to distant areas (see
McNeill, 1977) 2.
There is also abundant historical evidence of endemic disease as a factor in
individuals’ location decisions. Historians have shown that infectious diseases
causing high mortality rates among settlers were a key determinant of European
colonization. Among other examples, Acemoglu et al. (2001) refer to Crosby
(1986 pp. 143–144) who has shown that the Pilgrim Fathers decided to migrate to
the United States rather than to Guyana because of the high mortality rates from
infectious diseases in Guyana. We also know from Alexis de Tocqueville and other
witnesses of that period that it took the draining of the malarial swamps in the
State of Michigan in the mid nineteenth century for the interior of the state to be
opened up by settlers on a scale comparable to what had already occurred further
west in Illinois3.
Even today, there is a vast difference between different parts of the world in the
incidence of infectious disease. Mortality statistics published by the World Health
Organization4 reveal that deaths from infectious or parasitic disease make up just
over 2% of all deaths in Europe, and some 3% of deaths in North America, while
they make up over 52% of all deaths in Africa (9% of all deaths being due to malaria
and 20% of all deaths being due to HIV/AIDS). The world average is a little under
20% of all deaths. Given the importance of infectious disease in mortality, it would
be surprising if individuals did not take variations in its incidence into account in
their location decisions. The location of some important cities (Nairobi in Kenya,
for example, or Colombo in Sri Lanka) seems likely to have benefited from their
low rates of malarial incidence compared to the rest of the country.
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Obviously, there are correlations between high rates of disease prevalence and
a high incidence of poverty, and the complex linkages between poverty and in-
fectious disease make their interaction an interesting area of study. Economists
have begun to study the channels through which health outcomes interact with
economic factors (Bell and Gersbach, 2006, Bell et al. 2006, Duncan et al. 2002,
Hurd et al. 2003, Marmot, 2002). And there is strong evidence that epidemic
outbreaks cause important economic losses5. Furthermore, asset markets may
also be affected, as was observed on the housing market in Hong Kong after the
SARS outbreak (Wong, 2008). However, among these linkages, migration has
attracted rather little attention and yet has been under increasing focus since the
SARS outbreak in China.
This paper models how the decisions of individuals to live in different areas are
determined both by the health environment, captured in our model by different
prevalence rates of diseases, and by economic factors such as costs of living. To
capture the costs of living or of any fixed asset or amenity attached to a given area,
the price of which increases with more people willing to settle in the area, we
assume that there is a constant stock of land in each city and that rents will vary
to clear the market for land.6 This requires of course a dynamic set-up where the
economic and health environment are affected by migration, and in turn determine
individual decisions such as migration.
At the beginning of each period, individuals find themselves in one of two
cities, which differ in a number of characteristics including the prevalence of
disease. The two cities could also be interpreted as countries or regions, or even
in some circumstances as different sectors of the economy. 7 Individuals have
characteristics of their own, and in the model we focus on their health status
(wealth, which normally differs among individuals, is here assumed to be the
same for all individuals in one city so as to focus attention on differences in
health). These individuals must make decisions about whether to stay in their city
of origin or to migrate to the other city, which determines their consumption levels
and their risk of being infected in the future : the benefits of risk reduction must
be balanced against the costs, which here comprise not just migration costs but
also any difference in the cost of living in the two cities. Time is infinite and
the significance of the future is summarized in terms of a value function whose
parameters are the health status of the individual and the characteristics of the
city where she lives, both of these considered at the start of the following period.
Each individual’s decisions therefore involve balancing the impact of varying the
migration choice on her current utility and her future discounted value function.
We assume that healthy individuals in any one city are ex ante identical in
terms of risk of infection. In this respect, we differ from Mesnard and Seabright
(2009), where individuals differ in an individual risk parameter. As individuals
may have more information than the health authorities about their probability of
being infected, we showed that quarantine measures may have unexpected effects
on the spread of diseases, as they may give too high or too low incentives to
migrate. This comes from the fact that migrants exert an externality on other
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individuals living in the destination and origin areas, which depends on their own
risk of having caught the disease. The type of externality outlined in that two
period model affects the spread of disease in the short run – just after the outbreak
of an epidemic disease. In contrast, in the present paper, we show that there is
a qualitative difference between short run and long run externalities. When the
costs of migration are prohibitively high, an individual living in a city with zero
prevalence imposes a very large externality in the long run if she acquires an
infectious disease, because the people she infects directly and indirectly lead to
the disease eventually reaching a positive steady state prevalence. However, if
the same individual can migrate to a high prevalence city, the long run externality
he/she imposes is zero. The fact that migration may lead to a sorting of sick/healthy
individuals to high/low infected areas, has thus important policy implications that
are studied in the present paper.
We first present the model and then solve for a steady state in prevalence in
circumstances where migration costs are sufficiently high to discourage migration
both in and out of the steady state. As expected, we show that cities with a healthier
environment will have lower disease prevalence rates.
Next, we examine the properties of the steady states when migration costs are
sufficiently low that healthy individuals in the high prevalence city will wish to
migrate to the low-prevalence city, thereby bidding up rents in that city and en-
couraging sick individuals to migrate in the opposite direction. Historically, there
is good reason to think that segregation of neighborhoods by disease incidence
has an important influence on the spatial composition of cities and countries,
and that relative housing costs play an important part in this process. The East
End of London was considered a sink of disease (as well as of other unsavory
characteristics) and prosperous citizens paid considerable sums to live in the West
End, which thanks to the prevailing (westerly) winds could escape the noxious
odors emanating from the east more easily than the east could avoid those from
the west (the winds were thought to transmit disease – through “miasma” – as well
as foul odors). Thus, although we do not claim that the phenomena we model are
the only or even the main influences of infectious diseases on migration, it seems
likely that they help explain some important characteristics of the geography of
development, past, and present.
We show that, if all sick individuals do thus migrate, the prevalence rate in the
low-prevalence city declines to zero so that there are no more infected individuals
and migration in the steady state no longer occurs. However, the possibility of mi-
gration is important because it removes potentially infectious individuals from the
locality where they can infect the most other people. The possibility of migration
strictly lowers steady-state prevalence levels, and, it is unambiguously desirable
to reduce migration costs to make this possible.
Our prediction that migration may under certain conditions induce sorting by
health status has obvious echoes of the literature on segregation by individuals
induced by their demand for local public goods such as education. The idea
that individuals might sort between locations according to their preferences for
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local public goods goes back to Tiebout (1956), and there is a substantial more
recent literature exploring the conditions under which that sorting would result
in segregation of households by income (see Ellickson, 1971, for a pioneering
contribution and Epple, 2003, for an overview). As documented by Timmins
(2005), there is much controversy about the strength of such effects and about how
to estimate them econometrically. Particular applications have included sorting by
preference for education provision (see Bénabou, 1996a, b, and Fernandez and
Rogerson, 1996). There is a sense in which our model here documents broadly
similar effects, since the prevalence rate of a disease has the relevant characteristics
of a public good (or more precisely a public bad).
A distinctive feature of our model is that cities are likely to be in different
steady states depending on the level of migration costs, in some of which there
is sorting by migration, and with endogenous differences in health status even
in the equilibria without sorting. It is also true in our model, unlike in many
public-good models, that some of these equilibria can be Pareto-ranked, and in
particular that there exist equilibria with the possibility of sorting outside the
steady state that dominate equilibria without that possibility. These features in our
view cast useful light on the possible role of migration policies in selecting one
equilibria.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the links to the literature
on epidemiology. Section 3 presents the model, Section 4 explains how indi-
viduals make their decisions, Section 5 studies the steady-state equilibria and
shows that the existence of one or the other equilibrium depends importantly
on the level of migration costs. Section 6 discusses the policy implications and
concludes.
2. LINKS TO THE LITERATURE ON EPIDEMIOLOGY
Related work on infectious diseases can be classified in three main strands. A first
strand of the literature uses dynamic models of epidemic diseases to understand
the effects of different policies on the evolution of infectious diseases. For exam-
ple, Sethi (1978) studies optimal quarantine programs, which are modeled as an
exogenous decrease in the infectivity parameter characterizing a specific disease.
One shortcoming of these papers is that they assume away any potential behavioral
response to the policies/changes considered. However, there is growing evidence
pointing out that individual behavior is key to explain the evolution of aggregate
disease (see Auld 2003, Reluga 2010 and Fenichel, 2013).
Two further strands of the literature capture this key role of individual decisions.
Models of decisions where individuals are rational have mostly focused on
preventive behaviors such as vaccine or safe sex adoption (Geoffard and Philip-
son 1996, Kremer 2000, Philipson, 2000); or partner choice decision (Philipson,
2000, Dupas et al. 2014). These studies obtain the common result that central-
ized measures may be ineffective for a number of reasons overviewed by Chen
and Toxvaerd (2014). For example, Geoffard and Philipson (1996) show that
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if demand for prevention treatments such as vaccines is prevalence elastic ini-
tially successful public health efforts typically run into diminishing returns, not
simply for technical reasons but because the decline of a disease discourages
prevention. Similar considerations apply to the factors determining the adoption
of means of contraception as barrier methods for sexually transmissible diseases,
and a growing literature now focuses on the microeconomic determinants of such
individual decisions, in order to reach a better understanding of epidemiolog-
ical patterns (See Gersovitz and Hammer (2003, 2004) and Pattanayak et al.
(2007) for surveys of the evidence on the prevalence elasticity of preventive
behavior).
The third strand of literature, which can be characterized as Behavioral Epidemi-
ology, explores the consequences of individuals’ exposure to risk using models
of bounded rationality or studies how information about disease or the value of
treatments spreads via word-of-mouth learning (Medlock et al., 2009; d’Onofrio
et al., 2013; Bauch et al., 2013; Fenichel and Wang, 2013).
Although most of these studies appear to focus on a single aspect of epidemi-
ology, namely preventive behaviors, they explore a wide range of behavior types
with very different policy implications. Depending on whether individual deci-
sions are complements such as for adoption of safe sex or substitutes such as for
vaccination, interventions may have very different effects on the overall disease
prevalence. In particular, when prevention leads to complementarities between
individual utilities, multiple equilibria are possible. Our model will show that the
decision to migrate displays similar properties, which leads to multiple equilibria
and an interesting policy coordination issue.
To our knowledge, migration as a preventive behavior has not been studied
before Mesnard–Seabright (2009) and the effects of migration restrictions such as
quarantine measures have been overlooked by the literature using decentralized
decision making frameworks. Yet, as was observed in the aftermath of the Ebola
crisis, individuals may respond to strict quarantine measures by moving to dif-
ferent areas, which may have unexpected effects on the evolution of diseases. In
such circumstances, Mesnard–Seabright (2009) highlighted potential unexpected
effects of too strong quarantine measures pushing still asymptomatic but sick
individuals to escape from the epicenter of an epidemic disease: individuals who
are more accurately informed than the authorities about their previous exposure
to infection, may choose to migrate “strategically” just after the outbreak of an
epidemic disease into a low prevalence area while still asymptomatic, which entails
negative externalities.
The present paper highlights another channel through which migration restric-
tions for controlling spread of infectious diseases may have undesirable effects.
Even without asymmetric informational issues, we show that too strict migration
restrictions may lead in the long run to an equilibrium with a higher overall
prevalence rate of disease than without restrictions. Indeed, strong migration re-
strictions may distort the sorting of sick/healthy individuals to high/low infected
areas.
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3. THE MODEL
Consider a discrete time, infinite horizon model with two equally-sized cities in
terms of population, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}.8 Since our purpose here is to capture
externalities due to pure compositional effects, we focus on the fact that migration
incentives in one direction create pressures for migration in the opposite direc-
tion because of resource constraints and adopt the simplifying assumption that
populations are constant, and normalized to unity9.
Y denotes the constant per-period exogenous income in both cities (income is
an endowment, and agents are assumed identical in income).10 Out of this income,
individuals must pay a rent rit in the city in which they choose to live. To simplify
the calculations, we assume that land is not scarce at the margin in the city with
low rent, so that rit = 0 whenever rit < rjt . This means we can write rt ≡ rjt
for the city with high rent. This rent will be endogenously determined by a land
market that clears when the net demand of individuals for migration to the city
with high rent is zero.
We assume that one city has a more disease-prone environment, which favors
the spread of disease vectors (think for example of low altitude or a high degree of
humidity, which may favor airborne or insect borne diseases). We will capture the
degree of disease-proneness of city i’s environment by a parameter αi and assume,
without loss of generality, that α1, α2 < 1, which ensures interior solutions by
ruling out theoretically possible but empirically uninteresting cases of diseases
which affect the entire population.
Each individual can be in two states of health, denoted by θ : sick (S) or healthy
(H ).11 At time t , a proportion pit of city i’s population are sick, the proportion of
healthy inhabitants being therefore (1 − pit ). We call pit the “prevalence” of the
disease in city i at time t . We assume that the parameters αi are such as to ensure
that
p1t + p2t < 1 (1)
to capture the fact that the sick are a minority of the total population.
There is an exogenous utility cost m of migrating from one city to the other.
This represents any kind of costs, which, like psychological costs, may be non-
monetary and directly affect individuals’ utility. Utility is separable in this cost
and in a term U (ct , θt ) that is increasing and weakly concave in consumption ct
at time t .
The assumption that utility is separable in the migration cost greatly simplifies
the calculations because the derivatives of utility with respect to rents and disease
prevalence do not depend on whether an individual has migrated in any given
period, but it is unlikely that the qualitative findings of the model turn importantly
on this restriction.
At the beginning of each period, individuals observe their current health status.
They also have perfect foresight of the values of all parameters and city-level
endogenous variables (namely Y,m, p, and r). They choose whether or not to
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migrate to the other city and all individuals receive the incomes and pay the rents
in the city they have chosen to live in and consume the residual.
Accordingly, individuals living in city i face a per period budget constraint:
Y − rit = ct . (2)
The health status of individuals evolves as follows:
Healthy individuals’ likelihood of becoming infected increases with the local
prevalence, pit , and the degree of disease-proneness of their environment:
P [θt+1 = S/θt = H ] = αipit . (3)
Sick individuals recover from the disease naturally with exogenous probability
π.12
P [θt+1 = H/θt = S] = π. (4)
We assume π < α2 < α1 in order to focus on interior solutions (diseases with
higher recovery rates never become established as endemic in the population).
The expected present value of current and future utility of individuals of type




γ τ−1 [U (ct , θt ) − mIt ] , (5)
where It is an indicator function taking the value 1 if they migrate in period t ,
otherwise 0.
We make the following assumptions about the effect of sickness on individual
utilities:
Sickness lowers current welfare
U (ct , S) ≤ U (ct , H ) . (6)
The marginal utility of consumption is independent of health status
U ′ (ct , H ) = U ′ (ct , S) for all ct . (7)
This assumption, it should be noted, implies (by integration of the function over
a finite interval) that the utility cost of any given reduction in consumption de-
pends only on the amount of the reduction in consumption and not on the health
status of the individual experiencing it. Noting that utility is strictly monotonic in
consumption, this assumption implies that, for any θi and θj ,
U (Y, θi) − U (Y − ri, θi) > U
(
Y, θj
) − U (Y − rj , θj ) if and only if ri > rj .
(8)
In the context of our model, this has the consequence, as will be seen, that the
healthy are willing to pay more than the sick to migrate to live near to other
healthy people.13 Our model should hence be seen as exploring the consequences
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in equilibrium of an empirically interesting phenomenon – namely the greater
willingness of the healthy than the sick to migrate to live near other healthy
people.
Note that we do not allow individuals to smooth consumption across time.
Allowing for savings in our model would make each individual’s decisions in any
period dependent on the entire history of their consumption decisions as well as
on their entire medical history, which would greatly complexify the model with
no extra gains for the understanding of our main results. As it is, individuals’
decisions are fully determined by their current health status and their city of
residence, which gives us four distinct cases to study. We therefore write the
objective function explicitly as a function of current health status as Wit (θt ) .
4. INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS
We first note that the objective function can be rewritten as follows, where i is
the individual’s city at the beginning of the period and k is the city in which she
chooses to live:
Wit (θt ) = U (Y − rkt , θt ) − mIt + γ
∑
θt+1
Wkt+1 (θt+1) P (θt+1|θt ) ,
where It = 1 if i = k and 0 otherwise.
From this, it follows that Wit (θt ) is strictly increasing in Y and strictly decreasing
in rkt , and weakly decreasing in m.
Next, for each value of the current health status, we compare the utility of each
individual in case she chooses not to migrate to the utility in case she migrates.
4.1. Individual Migration Choices
A healthy individual who chooses not to migrate and for whom therefore k = i
will obtain utility V Nit (H ), which is equal to
V Nit (H ) = U (Y − rit , H ) + γαipitWit+1(S) + γ (1 − αipit )Wit+1(H ). (9)
A healthy individual who chooses instead to migrate will obtain utility V Mit (H ),
which is equal to
V Mit (H ) = U
(
Y − rjt , H
) − m + γαjpjtWjt+1(S) + γ (1 − αjpjt )Wjt+1(H )).
(10)
The agent who is currently sick and chooses not to migrate will receive utility
V Nit (S), which is equal to
V Nit (S) = U (Y − rit , S) + γπWit+1 (H ) + γ (1 − π ) Wit+1 (S) . (11)
A sick individual who chooses instead to migrate from city i to city j will obtain
utility
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V Mit (S), which is equal to
V Mit (S) = U
(
Y − rjt , S
) − m + γπWjt+1 (H ) + γ (1 − π ) Wjt+1 (S) . (12)
Consequently, the condition for healthy individuals to migrate rather than to remain
in their city of origin can be written as V Mit (H ) − V Nit (H ) ≥ 0, or written out in
full as
0 ≤ U (Y − rjt , H )−U (Y − rit , H )−m+γαjpjtWjt+1(S) − γαipitWit+1(S)
+γ (1 − αjpjt )Wjt+1(H ) − γ (1 − αipit )Wit+1(H ). (13)
Similarly, the condition for sick individuals to migrate, V Mit (S) − V Nit (S) ≥ 0, can
be written as out in full as
0 ≤ U (Y − rjt , S) − U (Y − rit , S) − m + γπ (Wjt+1 (H ) − Wit+1 (H ))
+γ (1 − π ) (Wjt+1 (S) − Wit+1 (S)) (14)
and we note that the conditions (13) and (14) are more likely to be fulfilled as
rit − rjt increases and as m decreases, as we would expect.
4.2. Migration Flows
Denote by sjt (hjt ), the proportion of the sick (healthy) who migrate from j to i
in period t .
The proportions sit , sjt , hit , and hjt of individuals of each type migrating from
one city to the other result from aggregating individual migration decisions shown
by the equations (13) and (14). Hence, they are determined by the level of migration
costs, by the differential in rental rates, which clear the market for land and by the
differential in disease prevalences. Specifically, if inequality (14) does not hold,
sit = 0, while if it holds with strict inequality then sit = 1. Likewise, if inequality
(13) does not hold, hit = 0, while if it holds with strict inequality then hit = 1.
We know that those falling sick in any period on a given city consist of those
previously healthy in the same city who have not migrated outwards and have fallen
sick, plus any previously healthy in the other city who have migrated inwards and
have fallen sick, plus those previously sick in the other city who have migrated
inwards and have not recovered, plus those who were previously sick in the same
city who have not migrated and who have not recovered. We can therefore write the
equations governing the evolution of prevalence rates in the two cities as follows:
pit+1 = (1 − π )pit (1 − si,) + αipit (1 − pit )(1 − hit )
+pjt (1 − π )sjt + αipit (1 − pjt )hjt , (15)
where (1 − π )pit (1 − sit ) represents the sick in period t who do not migrate and
remain ill; αipit (1 − p1t )(1 − hit ) are the healthy in t who do not migrate and
become sick; pjt (1 − π )sjt are the sick in period t who migrate from j to i and
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remain ill; αipit (1 − pjt )hjt are the healthy who migrate from j to i and become
sick.
For the land market to clear requires that net migration is zero, which, with
equally sized cities, implies





A final useful piece of notation is to define rHt (m) as the value of rt such that
inequality (13) binds for i = 1. Intuitively, rHt (m) is the value of rental in the
high-rent city in period t that is just high enough, given the level of migration cost
m, to dissuade healthy individuals from moving there from the zero-rent city. We
define rSt (m) analogously as the value of rental in the high-rent city in period t that
is just high enough, given the level of migration cost m, to induce sick individuals
to move away from there to the zero-rent city. As we shall see, when migration
occurs it is only of the healthy to the high-rent city and of the sick to the low-rent
city.
The next section characterises the different equilibria that may occur, a subset
of which may represent steady states.
4.3. Equilibrium
An equilibrium of the model at time t given prevalence rates p1t , p2t , is a set of
values rt , p1t+1,p2t+1, h1t , h2t , s1t , and s2t such that
1) p1t+1, p2t+1 are generated by equation (15);
2) Equation (16) is satisfied (i.e. the land market clears).
The Appendix establishes by Lemma 1 that, in equilibrium, there cannot be
migration in both directions by individuals of a given type. This necessary property
of any equilibrium is important to establish in Lemma 2 that an equilibrium
exists.14 We now consider the properties of equilibria in steady state.
5. STEADY STATE EQUILIBRIA
5.1. Properties of Steady State Equilibria
In the steady state, the proportions of individuals in each health category remain the
same across periods in each city, so we can write: pit = pit+1 = pi for i = 1, 2.
Therefore, the rental rate which clears the market remains constant in steady
state: rt = rt+1 = r . Similarly, we can write the steady state values of rHt (m) and
rSt (m) as r
H (m) and rS(m) respectively.
Lemmas 3 and 4 in the Appendix show interesting properties of the continuation
values for sick and healthy individuals to live in different cities in steady states,
which allow to establish the following Proposition:
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Proposition 1 In steady state equilibrium with m > 0 healthy individuals, if
they migrate, will do so from the unhealthy city to the healthy city, while sick
individuals, if they migrate, will do so in the opposite direction.
With minimal loss of generality, let α2p2 < α1p1 and call 2 the “healthy city”
in steady state and 1 the “unhealthy city”.15 Therefore, s1 = h2 = 0. We ignore
the case where α2p2 = α1p1 since migration would not take place for any positive
migration cost.
5.2. Existence, Uniqueness, and Stability of Equilibria
We now turn to studying the existence of different types of steady state equilibria.
It is straightforward to establish Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 There exists a steady state equilibrium with p1 = p2 = 0 and
zero gross migration.
This simply states that a disease cannot spread if it does not arise in the first
place, and follows from the fact that healthy individuals become infected with a
probability that is proportional to the prevalence of the city in which they choose
to live. The fact that there is zero gross migration follows trivially from the fact
that if prevalence is zero there is no motivation for migration from one city to the
other.
However, the zero-prevalence steady state is not stable, in the sense that once
an infection arises it will spread until the rate of new infections equals the rate at
which sick individuals recover from the disease. Our next propositions examine
the properties of such positive-prevalence steady states and show that they depend
on migration costs. One interpretation of such migration costs is the severity of
restrictions on international migration, but other interpretations are possible as
well; the important point of such an interpretation is that migration costs may be
influenced by public policy.
We now examine the elementary case of steady states where an infection arises
and the costs of migration are high enough to discourage all migration within
any relevant neighborhood of the steady state (hit = sit = 0 ∀i, t). Where gross
migration is zero, we know that those falling sick in any period consist of those
previously healthy who fall sick in the same city, and in the steady state, these will
exactly match the numbers recovering from the disease.
Indeed, the prevalence rate of disease in city i in period t + 1 will be equal to
the proportion of healthy individuals in period t who fell sick plus the proportion
of sick individuals in t who have not recovered from the disease. This can also
be seen easily after rewriting equation (15) in the case where hit = sit = 0 ∀i, t ,
which yields pit+1 = αipit (1 − pit ) + pit (1 − π ). Substituting the steady state
conditions that pit+1 = pit = pi implies that pi = 1 − π/αi for i = 1, 2. We
have thus established the following proposition:
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Proposition 3 When migration is impossible there exists a steady state in which
pi = 1 − π/αi for i = 1, 2.
This defines a unique equilibrium and implies cities with lower α (as for example
low degree of humidity for the case of malaria) have lower steady state levels of
disease prevalence and diseases with higher rates of natural recovery have lower
prevalence in the steady-state. We show in the Appendix that the steady state
prevalence rate in each city is locally stable.
Next, we consider whether there exist steady states that are compatible with
positive levels of gross migration. We first establish some properties of such a
steady state, if it exists, and we consider the conditions for its existence later.
Proposition 1 has established that it is not possible in the steady state to have
flows of healthy individuals migrating to city 1 (h2 = 0) and flows of sick individ-
uals migrating to city 2 (s1 = 0). Where gross migration is not zero, the zero net
migration implied by clearing of the rental market implies that some proportion
h1 of the healthy migrate from high prevalence to low prevalence cities, and those
who migrate in the other direction are a proportion s2 of the sick (who,unless
they recover from disease, have nothing to fear from high prevalence). We specify
“a proportion” because of our assumption that there are more healthy than sick
individuals, so complete migration by both populations will not be feasible.
Let the value ψ and φ be the the values taken in equilibrium by the variables h1
and s2 respectively. Note that φ > ψ when migration is strictly positive, because
p1t + p2t < 1 which implies that the sick in city 2 are less numerous than the
healthy in city 1.
We use the dynamics governing the evolution of diseases in the two cities open
to migration and the properties of steady state equilibria established earlier to
characterize the steady state equilibria with non-zero gross migration out of the
equilibrium as follows.
From equation (15) and given h2 = 0, s1 = 0 the steady state prevalence rates
in city 1 and city 2 will respectively satisfy
p1 = (1 − p)(1 − ψ)α1p1 + φp2(1 − π ) + p1(1 − π ); (17)
p2 = α2p2(1 − p2) + ψ(1 − p1)α2p2 + (1 − φ)p2(1 − π ). (18)
Moreover, the “adding up condition” has to hold in steady state, which implies
that the proportion φ of the sick who migrate in the steady state yields the same
absolute number of migrants as the proportion ψ of the healthy who migrate, so
that
φp2 = ψ (1 − p1) . (19)
And the “behavioral condition” implies that the demand for migration by propor-
tion φ of the sick is generated by the same r in city 2 as generates the demand for
migration by a proportion ψ of the healthy.
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FIGURE 1 (Colour online) Combinations of migration costs and rental rates leading sick
and healthy individuals to be indifferent about migration.
Replacing equation (19) into equation (17) and equation (18) gives the following
conditions characterizing these steady state equilibria:
p1 = (1 − p1)(1 − ψ)α1p1 + ψ (1 − p1) (1 − π ) + p1(1 − π ); (20)
p2 = α2 − π − φ(1 − π )
α2(1 − φ) or p2 = 0. (21)
Studying condition (21), we can show easily that there will no longer be migra-
tion at the steady state if p2 = 0 (Indeed 1 − p1 > 0 and equation (19) imply that
ψ = 0). Substituting ψ = p2 = 0 into equation (20), we show that p1 = 1 − πα1 .
The question now is whether such steady states exist. To explore this question,
recall that rH (m) and rS(m) denote respectively, for any m, the rental rate at which
healthy individuals in the high-prevalence city are just deterred from migrating
to the low prevalence city, and the rental rate at which sick individuals in the
low-prevalence city can just be induced to migrate to the high-prevalence city. It
is evident that rH (m) is decreasing in m and rS(m) is increasing in m. Let m∗ be
the value of m such that rH (m∗) = rS(m∗).
Figure 1 illustrates as follows: It shows rH (m) and rS(m), which will cross
at a strictly positive value of m, which we have defined as m∗, provided that
rH (0) > rS(0).16
Appendix shows that rH (0) > rS(0), such that we can establish the following
Proposition:
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Proposition 4 There exists m∗ > 0 such that, for all m < m∗, an equilibrium
exists with p1 = 1 − πα1 and p2 = 0. In this equilibrium, there is non-zero gross
migration outside the steady state but not at the steady state.
The intuition behind the proof is relatively straightforward: because the healthy
are more willing than the sick to pay to live in the low-prevalence city, there will
be a rental rate that compensates the sick for moving to the high-prevalence city
and does not deter the healthy from migrating to the low-prevalence city, provided
migration costs are low enough.
Note how the possibility of migration out of the steady state makes the crucial
difference between the steady states described in Propositions 3 and 4 even though
in the steady state no actual migration takes place. This is because any infected
individuals who arise in city 2, instead of remaining in city 2 where they progres-
sively infect the rest of the population, migrate out immediately to city 1. This
keeps the prevalence rate at zero in city 2. It has no lasting effect on the prevalence
in city 1, though, because in the steady state there is no further in-migration and
the prevalence in city 1 is determined in exactly the same way as it was in the
non-migration steady state.
Moreover, we show in the Appendix that the Low migration costs characterized
above generate an unstable root, which pushes the prevalence rate in the healthy
city to a corner. This type of corner steady state is the only one compatible with
positive migration flows along the transition path and is robust to small changes
of parameter values.
It is straightforward to show that there is no steady state equilibrium with non-
zero gross migration in steady state (such that ϕ > 0, ψ > 0 ), because to do so
would require the two migration inequalities (13) and (14) to bind at the same
level of r , which is impossible as shown in the proof of Proposition 1.17
Having established the existence of these equilibria, we now turn to highlighting
an interesting property of the steady state with migration in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 In the equilibrium with p2 = 0, the healthy city may be the
city with the more disease-prone environment, that is, p2 < p1 is compatible with
α2 > α1.
The proof of this proposition follows immediately from Proposition 1and noting
that if p2 = 0, α2p2 = 0 < α1p1 whatever the value of α2.
This shows that, in the case of Low migration costs, there is a possibility of
multiple equilibria because of strategic complementarities in the utility function.
Indeed the probability of becoming infected is a positive function of the degree of
disease-proneness in city i, αi , and of the proportion of sick individuals in city i,
pi , but the latter is determined in equilibrium. This generates a clear coordination
problem and underlines an important role of expectations in the model. A city
can be established as the more healthy city, and therefore become a destination
for healthy individuals, with higher rents that drive out sick individuals, simply
because it is expected to be more healthy, in spite of having a more disease-prone
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environment. However, it is unlikely that it would become so established if mi-
gration costs are initially very high and are gradually reduced, since the autarky
prevalence of the more disease-prone city will be higher, so that initial migration
by the healthy is likely to be from the more disease-prone to the less disease-prone
environment.
Finally, we can show that the range of values of m for which a steady state
exists with migration by the healthy to the city with the more disease-prone
environment is strictly smaller than the range of values of m for which a steady
state exists with migration by the healthy to the city with the less disease-prone
environment. A consequence of the proof of Proposition 4 is that rH (0) − rS(0) is
strictly decreasing in the value of α2 as well as in the value of π . Thus, the more
disease prone the environment of the city to which the healthy are migrating and
the higher the recovery rate, the smaller the value of the m∗ for which a migration
equilibrium exists. This is rather intuitive since a more disease prone environment
of the healthy city and a higher recovery rate make migration less attractive as a
way of escaping from endemic diseases.
This allows us to state our final proposition which characterizes existence
conditions of steady state equilibria for all values of m.
Proposition 6 For any value of π , there exists two strictly positive values of m,
m∗, and m′, with m′ < m∗ such that, the following steady state equilibria exist:




2) when migration costs lie between m′ and m∗, the only equilibrium has migration out
of steady state by the healthy from the city with the more disease-prone environment
to the city with the less disease-prone environment; p1 = 1 − πα1 and p2 = 0.
3) when migration costs lie below m′, there are two steady state equilibria in each of
which p1 = 1 − πα1 and p2 = 0 . In the first steady state, city 2, the city to which the
healthy migrate out of steady state, is the one with the less disease-prone environment
and, in the second, city 2 is the one with the more disease-prone environment.
Figure 2 illustrates the relation of m′ to m∗.
5.3. Welfare Comparisons
Now, we can consider the comparative welfare properties of the steady states with
and without the possibility of migration. It is straightforward to see that the steady
states with migration are Pareto-superior to the steady state without migration.
Prevalence in city 1 is the same in the steady states defined by Propositions 3 and
4; only that in city 2 differs (and is strictly lower in the migration steady states).
Given that there is no migration (and therefore no migration costs incurred) in
all steady states, this means that the steady states with migration have fewer
sick individuals and incur no offsetting costs. We have therefore established the
following:
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FIGURE 2 (Colour online) Thresholds for existence and multiplicity of steady state equi-
libria.
Proposition 7 The steady states with migration are Pareto-Superior to the
steady state without migration.
However, we can also Pareto-rank the two steady states that exist when migration
costs lie below m′, since they differ in their values of α1, and therefore in the
prevalence rates in the high-prevalence city. It is immediate that
Proposition 8 The second steady state, that exists only when migration costs
are lower than m′, has lower prevalence than, and is therefore Pareto Superior to,
the first steady state.
Proposition 6 has merely characterized the steady states according to whether or
not migration costs are low enough for gross migration to occur out of steady state.
The fact that the steady states with non-zero gross migration out of equilibrium
Pareto-dominate that with zero migration has important implications for policy. In
this model, it is a good thing for there to be outmigration of sick individuals from
city 2 (driven by the higher rents due to competition from individuals in-migrating
from city 1 ). The reason for this is that outmigration of such individuals removes
them from where they would contribute to new infections and places them in a city
in which the disease is already established and to which their presence will bring
no lasting deterioration in the prevalence. In these circumstances, action by the
authorities should not be to discourage migration (which may be a by-product of
quarantine measure or of other types of migration restrictions) but rather actively
to encourage it. In the steady state, there will in fact be no migration, but out of
the steady state such migration is an important means of reducing the risk that the
disease established in city 1 also establishes itself in city 2.
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6. CONCLUSION
Our analysis indicates that differences in disease prevalence rates can emerge as
the equilibrium outcome of more fundamental differences in environment, with
migration behavior acting as a means of arbitrage between locations with different
prevalence levels. We have also shown that whether migration takes place out
of the steady state has important implications for steady state prevalence levels
even if there is no migration at the steady state. In particular, it is desirable
for infected individuals to migrate away from low-prevalence localities since
these are the ones in which they create the greatest negative externalities. This
has potentially important implications for policy since it suggests that, far from
seeking to discourage voluntary migration in conditions of endemic disease, it
may sometimes be desirable to encourage it.
A key mechanism in our model is that the willingness to pay of healthy indi-
viduals to live close to other healthy individuals exceeds that of sick individuals,
which leads to sorting by health and higher costs of living in healthier areas. This,
however, is true only under certain conditions. As we discussed, under certain
alternative assumptions, it could be that sick individuals would have a higher will-
ingness to pay to live in low-prevalence environments, which would act against
segregation: recovery rates may, for example, be higher in rich cities due to better
health infrastructures and income dynamics or family decisions may make sick
people less likely to migrate to poor cities with high prevalence rates. Moreover, as
highlighted in Mesnard and Seabright (2009), under different assumptions about
the distribution of past exposure to the disease and the asymmetric information
individuals may have on their own risk, migrants to low-prevalence destinations
may include a significant proportion of asymptomatic individuals likely to become
sick, thereby mitigating segregation effects in the short run even if they do not
wholly offset them.
Finally, we have shown that expectations may matter in this model with fully
rational individuals, which leads to the possibility of multiple equilibria and gen-
erates an interesting coordination problem. However, it is also possible that in-
dividuals are not fully rational nor perfectly informed on their health risks when
considering their location decisions, which may lead to the existence of other
equilibria.
The conditions described in our model are thus not general but they do constitute
an important class of cases for public policy to bear in mind. They warn policy
makers to take into account positive externalities generated by migration in the
presence of endemic diseases. Public policy needs to model very carefully the
interactions between disease and migration in order to ensure that policy inter-
ventions do not have counter-productive consequences in the short run (Mesnard
and Seabright 2009) and in the long run, as highlighted in the present paper. We
also believe that segregation by disease-prevalence of neighborhoods within cities,
and of regions within countries, has been a phenomenon of historical significance
which models of this kind can help us to understand. Given the startling differences
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in disease prevalence between different regions of the world, it remains of real
significance today. And given the likely emergence of new forms of antibiotic-
resistant infections in years to come, some of which may become endemic in
certain parts of the world, the problem can only grow in importance in the future.
APPENDIX A: PROOFS
Lemma 1 There cannot be migration in both directions in equilibrium by individuals of a
given type.
Proof of Lemma 1.
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that if rt = rHt (m), inequality (13) is weakly
satisfied for i = 2.
Then, inserting rHt (m) in inequality (13) for i = 1 yields
U (Y,H ) − U (Y − rHt (m), H ) = Zt − m, (22)
where
Zt = γα2p2tW2t+1(S) − γα1p1tW1t+1(S)
+ γ (1 − α2p2t )W2t+1(H ) − γ (1 − α1p1t )W1t+1(H ).
Setting i = 2 in inequality (13) yields
0 ≤ U (Y,H ) − U (Y − rHt (m), H ) − m − Zt
and substituting equation (22) in inequality (13) yields
0 ≤ Zt − m − m − Zt
which is a contradiction as m > 0. This shows that inequality (13) cannot be satisfied
for both i = 1 and i = 2 if rt = rHt (m). For all rt > rHt (m), inequality (13) will not be
satisfied for i = 1, while for all rt < rHt (m) inequality (13) will not be satisfied for i = 2.
Thus, inequality (13) cannot be simultaneously satisfied for i = 1 and i = 2 at any value
of rt . Analogous arguments when inequality (14) binds for i = 2 inequality (14) cannot be
simultaneously satisfied for i = 1 and i = 2 at any value of rt . 
Lemma 2 establishes that an equilibrium exists:
Lemma 2 For any p1t , p2t and for any s1t , s2t implied by p1t , p2t , there exist hit , for
i = 1, 2 such that equation (16) is satisfied with0 ≤ hit ≤ 1.
Proof of Lemma 2.






for i = 1, 2
which can be rewritten
hj, = sitpit(
1 − pjt
) for i = 1, 2.
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and since 0 ≤ sit ≤ 1, it follows that
0 ≤ hit ≤ 1. 
Properties of Steady State Equilibria
We write Wi (H ) = Wit (H ) = Wit+1 (H ) and Wi (S) = Wit (S) = Wit+1 (S) for the con-
tinuation value of living in city i for a healthy and a sick individual respectively.
We can therefore write the migration conditions (13) and (14) in their steady state forms
as
0 ≤ U (Y − rj , H ) − U (Y − ri , H ) − m + γαjpjWj (S) − γαipiWi(S)
+γ (1 − αjpj )Wj (H ) − γ (1 − αipi)Wi(H ) (23)
and
0 ≤ U (Y − rj , S) − U (Y − ri , S) − m + γπ (Wj (H ) − Wi (H ))
+γ (1 − π ) (Wj (S) − Wi (S)) . (24)
We can then show two properties of the continuation values summarized in Lemmas 3 and
4.
Lemma 3 In steady state equilibrium, the additional continuation value of being healthy
rather than sick in city i, Wi (H ) − Wi (S), is strictly positive and decreasing in the preva-
lence rate pi , in the unhealthiness parameter αi , and in the recovery rate π.
Proof. Subtracting equation (11) from equation (9) yields
Wi (H ) − Wi (S) = U (Y − ri , H ) − U (Y − ri , S)
+γ (1 − αipi − π )Wi (H ) − γ (1 − αipi − π )Wi (S)
which implies that
Wi (H ) − Wi (S) = U (Y − ri , H ) − U (Y − ri , S)
1 − γ (1 − αipi − π )
which is strictly positive by assumption (6) and strictly decreasing in αi , pi , and π . 
Lemma 4 In steady state equilibrium, if αjpj > αipi the difference between the addi-
tional continuation values for healthy and sick individuals of living in city i rather than in
city j, (Wi (H ) − Wj (H )) − (Wi (S) − Wj (S)), is str ictly positive and decreasing in the
prevalence rate pi , in the unhealthiness parameter αi , and in the recovery rate π.
Proof.
From equation (9) we can write
Wi (H ) − Wj (H ) = U (Y − ri , H ) − U
(
Y − rj , H
) + γαipiW i (S) − γαjpjWj (S)




Wj (H ) . (25)
Similarly,
Wi (S) − Wj (S) = U (Y − ri , S) − U
(
Y − rj , S
) + γπ [Wi (H ) − Wj (H )]
+γ (1 − π ) [Wi (S) − Wj (S)] . (26)
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First, note that U (Y − ri , θ ) − U
(
Y − rj , θ
)
is independent of θ by equation (8), thus[
U (Y − ri , H ) − U
(
Y − rj , H
)] − [U (Y − ri , S) − U (Y − rj , S)] = 0.
Therefore, subtracting equation (26) from equation (25) and re-arranging yields
Wi (H ) − Wj (H ) − [Wi (S) − Wj (S)]
= Wi (H ) [γ (1 − αipi − π )] − Wi (S) [γ (1 − αipi − π )]
. . . − Wj (H ) [γ (1 − αjpj − π )] + Wj (S) [γ (1 − αjpj − π )]
which in turn yields
Wi (H ) − Wj (H ) − Wi (S) + Wj (S)
= 1




Wj (H ) − Wj (S)) − αipi (Wi (H ) − Wi (S))] .
The RHS expression is strictly positive because αjpj > αipi and
αipi
(
Wi (H ) − Wi (S)) = αipi U (Y − ri , H ) − U (Y − ri , S)
1 − γ (1 − αipi − π )
which is strictly increasing in αipi because x1+c+bx is strictly increasing in x for all x if
1 + c ≥ 0. 
Proof of Proposition 1.
Define r∗(S) as the value of r2 such that inequality (24) binds for i = 1. Intuitively, r∗(S)
is the value of rental in the low-prevalence city that is just high enough to dissuade sick
individuals from moving there from the high-prevalence city. This yields
U (Y, S) − U (Y − r∗(S), S) = Z′ − m, (27)
where
Z




Z − Z′ = W 2(H ) [γ (1 − α2p2 − π )] − W 1(H ) [γ (1 − α1p1 − π )]
+W 2(S) [γ (α2p2 + π − 1)] − W 1(S) [γ (α1p1 + π − 1)] .
Simplifying yields
Z − Z′ = γ (1 − α2p2 − π )
[
W 2(H ) − W 2(S)] − γ (1 − α1p1 − π ) [W 1(H ) − W 1(S)] .
This must be strictly greater than zero since (1 − α2p2 − π ) > (1 − α1p1 − π ) and
W 2(H ) − W 1(H ) ≥ W 2(S) − W 1(S) from Lemma 4. Therefore, from equations (22) and
(27) we can see that
U (Y,H ) − U (Y − r∗(H ),H ) > U (Y, S) − U (Y − r∗(S), S)
which implies that r∗(H ) > r∗(S) given equation (8). Thus, sick individuals will be dis-
suaded from migrating to the low-prevalence city at a lower rental rate than will dissuade
healthy individuals. Thus, for any rental rate at which sick individuals want to migrate to
the low-prevalence city, healthy individuals also want to migrate in this direction. Since
by Lemma 1, there cannot be individuals of either health status simultaneously wishing
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to migrate in the opposite direction, this cannot be an equilibrium satisfying the zero
net migration condition. Thus, in equilibrium sick individuals, if they migrate at all in
equilibrium, must migrate only to the high-prevalence city. Analogous arguments show
that sick individuals will choose to migrate from the high-prevalence city at a lower rental
rate than healthy individuals.
Therefore, there is no rental rate at which only sick individuals migrate to the low-
prevalence city and healthy individuals to the high-prevalence city. Thus, healthy individ-
uals, if they migrate, will do so from the high-prevalence to the low-prevalence city while
sick individuals, if they migrate, will do so in the opposite direction. 
Proof of Proposition 4.
Using equation (13), we define rHt (m) implicitly as follows:
m = U (Y − rHt (m), H ) − U (Y, H ) + γαjpjtWjt+1(S) − γαipitWit+1(S)
+γ (1 − αjpjt )Wjt+1(H ) − γ (1 − αipit )Wit+1(H ). (28)
Substituting i = 1 and j = 2, taking steady state values and noting that p1 = 1 − πα1 and
p2 = 0 yields
m = U (Y − rH (m), H ) − U (Y, H )
+γ (π − α1)W1(S)
+γW2(H ) − γ (1 − α1 + π )W1(H ). (29)
Using equation (14), we define rSt (m) implicitly as follows:
m = U (Y, S) − U (Y − rSt (m), S) + γπ (Wjt+1 (H ) − Wit+1 (H ))
+γ (1 − π ) (Wjt+1 (S) − Wit+1 (S)) . (30)
Substituting i = 2 and j = 1, taking steady state values and noting that p1 = 1 − πα1 and
p2 = 0 yields
m = U (Y, S) − U (Y − rS(m), S) + γπ (W1 (H ) − W2 (H ))
+γ (1 − π ) (W1 (S) − W2 (S)) . (31)
Equation (8) implies that rH (0) > rS(0) if U (Y, H ) − U (Y − rH (0), H ) > U (Y, S) −
U
(
Y − rS(0), S).
Define R ≡ (U (Y,H ) − U (Y − rH (0), H )) − (U (Y, S) − U (Y − rS(0), S)). Then,
setting m = 0 and using equations (29) and (31) yields
R = γW2(H ) − γ (1 − α1 + π )W1(H ) + γ (π − α1)W1(S)
+γπ (W1 (H ) − W2 (H )) + γ (1 − π ) (W1 (S) − W2 (S)) . (32)
This can be rewritten as R = Aγ (1 − π ) + B(α1 − π ), where
A = (W2 (H ) − W1 (H )) − (W2 (S) − W1 (S))
which, since α1p1 > α2p2, is strictly positive by Lemma 4, and
B = (W1 (H ) − W1 (S))
which is strictly positive by Lemma 3. Therefore, R > 0, which implies that rH (0) > rS(0).
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Using the definition of m∗ this implies that m∗ > 0.
Lemmas 3 and 4 also imply that R, and therefore rH (0) − rS(0), is decreasing in α2 and
in π . 
APPENDIX B
Local Stability of the Equilibrium without Migration
pit+1 = u(pit ) = αipit (1 − pit ) + pit (1 − π ).
The steady state equilibrium in each city is a fixed point such that u′(pi) = pi.
We can derive the function u(.) as u′(pit ) = 1 − π + αi − 2αipit and note that the steady
state pi is stable if |u′(pit )| < 1 around the steady state.
This condition is equivalent to
2(αipit − 1) < −π + αi < 2αipit .
We can show easily that 2(αipit − 1) < −π + αi since −π + αi > 0 by assumption and
αipit < 1.
Since pi = 1 − π/αi for i = 1, 2 we show easily that, close to the steady state, 2αipit ∼=
2(αi − π ), which is clearly larger than αi − π.
Therefore, the steady state equilibrium is locally stable.
Local Stability of the Equilibria with Migration
We have the following dynamic system:
p1t+1 = f (p1t , p2t ) = [(1 − p1t )(1 − h1t )α1 + (1 − π )] p1t + s2tp2t (1 − π );




(1 − π ) − (1 − h1t )α1p1t + (1 − h1t )α1 s2t (1 − π )
−h1t α2p2t α2 − α2p2t + h1t (1 − p1t )α2 + (1 − s2t )(1 − π )
)
.
After writing p(χ ) = |J − χI | = | fp1 − χ fp2
gp1 gp2 − χ |, we can study the Eigenvalues of J ,
roots of the equation p(χ ) ≡ χ 2 − (trJ )χ + det J = 0.
We know that in Equilibrium s2(=φ)= h1(=ψ)= 0, p1 = 1 − π/α1, and p2 = 0 such
that J = ( 1 00 α2 + 1 − π ) and p(χ ) can be rewritten as
p(χ ) = χ 2 − (2 − π + α2)χ + (α2 + 1 − π ).
The two Eigenvalues χ1 and χ2 are as follows:
χ1 = α2 − π + 1;
χ2 = 1.
Since |χ1| > 1 and |χ2| = 1 such equilibria are locally unstable.
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NOTES
1 See for example Boily (2002) on migration patterns of HIV infected sex-workers or Lurie
et al. (2003) on migrant couples in South-Africa with higher rates of HIV infection than non-
migrant.
2 During the Black Death, inhabitants from infected villages frequently migrated to less infected
neighboring villages. More recently, after the SARS outbreak in China, numerous workers in urban
areas returned to live with their families in safer rural areas.
3 Alexis de Tocqueville arrived in Detroit in 1831 and was very troubled by mosquitoes during his
travels (he speaks in his journal of “inexpressible torment caused by mosquitoes” ; Tocqueville 1981,
p.140). The initiative shown by Americans in organizing to drain wetlands impressed Tocqueville
and was one of the features he contrasted with the French dependence on central government. See
http://www.mackinac.org/article.asp?ID=25
4 Downloadable from http://www3.who.int/whosis
5 For example, losses associated to the SARS outbreak have been estimated between US$10 and
US$30 billion, as compared to the 1994 outbreak of plague in India, the costs of which were estimated
at around US$2 billions.
6 It may be more realistic for certain epidemics to consider the possibility of individuals fleeing
high-prevalence cities to stay with friends or relatives in lower-prevalence cities, implying an aggregate
temporary population shift between cities without any adjustment on the land market. This is captured
by Mesnard and Seabright (2009) in an epidemic framework. Here, by contrast, we consider longer-
run location decisions where capacity constraints may play a significant role. In the model, total
capacity of each city is fixed and cannot be changed by (for instance) construction, but less stringent
constraints would preserve the qualitative features of our results. Total capacity constraints also make
it easier to define and solve for a steady state as population size in each city remains constant over
time.
7 For instance, decisions of individuals to become sex workers, or within the commercial sex sector
to move between street prostitution and the formal brothel-based sector, are likely to be influenced by
what is known about relative risks of sexually-transmitted disease.
8 The two cities could also be interpreted as countries or regions, or even in some circumstances
as different sectors of the economy. For instance, decisions of individuals to become sex workers, or
within the commercial sex sector to move between street prostitution and the formal brothel-based
sector, are likely to be influenced by what is known about relative risks of sexually-transmitted disease.
9 The case where population sizes can change together with the types of migrants after the outbreak
of an epidemic disease is already studied in Mesnard and Seabright (2009).
10 Introducing heterogeneity in income level would only complexify the model without adding
much insight to the results. Rich individuals will have higher willingness to pay for high rents and live
in the low prevalence area than poor individuals and unless they are systematically more likely to be
sick, this will not affect the properties of the sorting equilibria according to health status we describe
below.
11 In contrast to Mesnard and Seabright (2009), our model does not need to assume private
information of healthy individuals on their ex-ante risk of infection to generate unexpected effects of
policy measures.
12 We could extend the model by assuming that this probability depends on health care avail-
ability and quality, which may be higher where costs of living are higher. This would introduce two
counteracting effects: first, the differential in prevalence rates across cities in steady state equilibrium
would increase as the high prevalence city with low costs will have a lower rate of recovery than the
low-prevalence city with high costs of living. Second, this would give an incentive for sick individuals
to stay in the high costs city where they are more likely to recover. As long as there is a range of
parameters’ values such that the second effect does not fully off-set the incentives for sick individuals
to live in the low costs city, the results would remain qualitatively the same.
13 With the exception of Finkelstein et al. (2013), who use data on elderly people in the US
struck by chronic diseases, there is remarkably very little empirical work on how marginal utility of
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consumption depends on health, and we see no compelling reason to think that the relationship for
communicable diseases runs in one way rather than the other.
14 Proofs of all lemmas and propositions not shown in the text are in Appendix.
15 The healthy city can be the one with the more disease prone environment (α2 > α1 is compatible
with α2p2 < α1p1 ).
16 The linearity of the functions rH (m) and rS (m) is for illustration only. The only requirement
for the demonstration is that these functions are monotonic, as stated above.
17 In earlier variations of this paper, we experimented with assuming heterogeneous migration
costs, which we conjectured led to equilibria with non-zero gross migration in steady state but made
the model analytically intractable for little additional insight.
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